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Abstract
As an increasing number of homeowners decide to take advantage of distributed
renewable resources such as rooftop solar, we may need to rethink the current regulatory
paradigm and governance structure of the electric market. This thesis examines the
shortcomings of current net metering programs in California. While the current Net
Metering 2.0 proceeding highlights a clash of solar advocates and electric utilities, it is in
fact revealing an underlying structural flaw that has been present all along. In order to
send the appropriate price signals to solar customers, both the structure by which utilities
recover costs and the rate at which solar customers are compensated must be reconceived.
I show how the current debates over the appropriate price to compensate solar customer
are built on a flawed rate structure. Without addressing the underlying inefficiencies of
current rate structures, it is unlikely that we will maintain utilities’ financial ability to
operate and maintain grid infrastructure and provide solar customers with the proper
incentives to reach the ideal transition to solar energy.
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Introduction
In January 2016, solar advocates achieved a substantial victory for the future of
rooftop solar in California. The Public Utilities Commission released a decision on
California’s net energy metering program, “sid[ing] mainly with the solar industry and its
proponents” (Cardwell, 2016, p. 2). This kept current policies largely intact, and was also
considered to be a loss for electric utilities, who have already filed to overturn it. As net
metering programs are coming into question in many states, it is important to examine the
long-term viability of such programs, particularly as the volume of rooftop solar
continues to grow.
Debates about renewable energy programs such as net metering are situated
within a much broader discussion of methods to effectively address climate change and
other environmental concerns. In order to avoid the most severe damages of a changing
climate, it is widely believed that the United States must decrease its greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions 80% by 2050. In fact, many suggest that this represents only the most
conservative scientific findings and that much more dramatic cuts will be necessary to
avoid catastrophic changes. For the U.S. power sector, this means changing the means of
generation on a scale that has never been seen before—with the exception of the rise of
fossil fuels. In many spheres, the problem is discussed as simply developing the capacity
to provide enough new renewable generation to meet our energy needs. However, to see
this as merely a challenge of scale is profoundly misguided. Many new technologies
present not only economic feasibility challenges, but also pose technical and regulatory
ones. For many renewable technologies, especially wind and solar, increasing capacity
requires finding a way to match generation with demand. In the absence of viable and
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scalable storage technologies, the intermittence and variability of renewable resources is
often the biggest challenge.
This, however, is not the most pressing issue to confront in our attempts to make
the necessary emission reductions that are necessary. As an increasing number of people
decide to take advantage of distributed renewable resources such as rooftop solar, we
need to rethink the current regulatory paradigm and governance structure of the electric
market. The challenge therefore is not only finding a way to install enough new
generation capacity, but additionally to devise a regulatory and transmission system that
is capable of coordinating massive energy efficiency and distributed renewable efforts.
Many countries have recognized the need to radically transform their power
sectors to significantly decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with the
production and provision of electricity. California, although not a country, remains one of
the largest economies in the world, and has long been on the forefront of climate policy
and legislation. This commitment has been substantiated by AB32—the state’s climate
policy—along with net zero energy goals, and renewable portfolio standards. California
is currently in the process of radically restructuring the way that it provides power to its
residents and end users. This has resulted in an unprecedented attempt to change both the
supply and transmission systems. Under current policies, older, dirtier, fossil fuel power
plants are being phased out and replaced by either natural gas plants or renewable power
generation. The state is attempting to utilize renewable resources at utility, community,
and individual levels. The ambitious goals that have been established by California
require that every aspect of the current electricity system be re-examined. The growing
network of renewable energy technologies is encouraging new schools of thought
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regarding utility ownership models, customer engagement, and ownership of electric
generation (Jeremy Carl, Dian Grueneich, David Fedor, n.d.).
One aspect of the state’s renewable energy plan is the widespread distribution of
rooftop solar. Unlike large, utility-scale solar plants, rooftop solar is considered a form of
“distributed generation,” usually small-scale, customer-sited generation systems. State
political leaders continually affirm the potential importance of rooftop solar energy. In
2006, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger introduced the Million Solar Roofs
initiative. More recently, Governor Jerry Brown has also set a goal for California to
generate 12,000 MW of distributed generation1 (DG) by the year 2020, further signaling
the central role of DG technologies in California’s path forward (Jeremy Carl, Dian
Grueneich, David Fedor, n.d.). Since then, California has led the nation in solar
installations, ranking #1 in annual solar installations since 2013 (Association, 2015).
While there has been significant discussion regarding the technological difficulties
associated with the state’s ambitious goals, there has been far less discussion of whether
the current regulatory framework and utility models will be able to facilitate the massive
transformation that is required to reach the socially efficient level of distributed solar.
The challenge of finding a regulatory structure for increasing amounts of
distributed generation is especially pronounced in California, where utilities represent a
variety of business models. While California is host to both public and investor owned
utilities, it is for the most part serviced by a central grid, “characterized” as Peskoe
(2016) states, “ by large power plants interconnected by high-voltage transmission lines”
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(p. 16). Currently, the spread of DG solar is seen by utilities as a disruption that is being
introduced to a system that relies on regulated, central monopolies. In California, the
most relevant debate is over the future of net metering, a program that began in 1995, and
allows solar customers to sell excess energy back to the grid. Recently, a number of cases
have been brought before Public Utilities Commissions in a number of states, including
California, Arizona, and Nevada, questioning the structure of net metering. In California,
the most significant proceeding is one known as Net Metering 2.0. It is the program that
has largely allowed the solar industry to boom in California to the extent that it has. The
premise of the claims brought forward by many Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs)—
privately held companies, such as PG&E, that are regulated by the CPUC—is that solar
customers are being compensated more than they should be for the energy that they
generate, and that the net energy metering (NEM) program should be re-evaluated.
The underlying concern of electric utilities facing increasing DG generation is
derived from the misalignment of how utilities incur costs and how these same costs are
recovered. While there are numerous debates about the details, the underlying structure of
utility cost recovery is largely responsible for the opposition to DG technologies that
many utilities now express. In order to better understand the current conflict, I first
present a brief history of the development of electric utilities, the central grid paradigm,
and the current regulatory structure. After looking at this history in Chapter 1, Chapter 2
examines the repercussions of an increasing development of solar generation. In this
chapter, I also look more closely at current policies designed to promote renewable
energy in California, situating the current net metering debate within the context of
broader policy discussion. Chapter 3 looks more specifically at the recent rise in rooftop
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solar and some of the policies that have allowed for this growth. Finally, Chapter 4
provides a theoretical framework for understanding the proposed modifications to net
metering policy, using economic models to analyze arguments made by both electric
utilities and solar advocates. Ultimately, this thesis reveals the shortcomings of the net
metering paradigm. I show how the current debates over the appropriate price to
compensate solar customer are built on a flawed rate structure. Without addressing the
underlying inefficiencies of current rate structures, it is unlikely that we will provide solar
customers with the proper incentives to reach the ideal transition to solar energy.
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I.

Electricity in California

The California Electric System
Before attempting to examine the regulatory and governance structure of the
electricity market, it is important to consider how this market first came to be, as well as
the functions that it was originally designed to serve. It might seem that the electric grid
simply provides energy to all those who are connected, but it actually reflects a complex
balancing act of regulators, generators, and operators. While many people focus on issues
of pricing electricity, the physical complexity of the electric system is often overlooked.
The California electric grid provides over 30 million consumers with their daily energy
needs. The California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) is the
institution that is responsible for coordinating California’s wholesale electricity markets.
This entails matching the production of over 670 power plants with the millions of
residential, commercial, and industrial customers in the state (Trabish, 2012). The
primary purpose of the electric market in California is to perfectly match the supply of
energy produced with the demand for energy. In the absence of any significant storage
technology, this constraint must be met on a second to second basis. This aspect of the
electric system, along with the high fixed costs associated with constructing and
operating the grid, require it to be carefully regulated. Unlike other goods, periods of
“surplus” or “shortage” in the electricity market can result in significant service
interruptions and are considered unacceptable.
In order to understand the basic physical transformations that the grid must
accomplish, Peter Fox-Penner proposes an analogy to a series of ponds connected by
small channels. Each pond represents a generator, with a waterfall feeding into it. The
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rate at which the water is flowing into the pond from the waterfall is the rate of electricity
generation for that generator. The channels linking ponds represent the transmission
system, allowing water to flow freely between all ponds.
In this system, the ponds are all at identical elevations. The result is that if water
is added to any particular pond, it is naturally diverted to all other ponds through every
channel until the levels of all ponds in the system has equalized. This is the way that
electricity is distributed throughout the transmission network, without the ability to direct
specific flow through a particular channel. Connected to various ponds are the energy
consumers, who are able to take water through a small straw. The challenge for the entire
power system is to maintain a stable level of water in all the ponds. A shortage or surplus
will result in service interruptions and possibly blackouts. This means ensuring that the
amount of water flowing into the ponds exactly equals the amount being withdrawn on a
second to second basis. It is the responsibility of the CAISO to ensure that all electricity
demand is met by utilizing the most socially efficient generation resources. However, in
the presence of a negative externality associated with some forms of generation, it is
unlikely that the CAISO will be able to achieve this goal.
The CAISO is responsible for managing the flow of electricity for approximately
80% of California along with a small number of areas in Nevada (Trabish, 2012). The
CAISO is considered the largest of the 38 balancing agencies in the western
interconnection. A balancing agency is responsible for ensuring that supply and demand
of electricity are matched for a given service area. While the CAISO is responsible for
managing the flow over most of California’s service areas, there are a number of areas
that are overseen by local public power companies, such as the Los Angeles Department
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of Water and Power. The primary purpose of any electric system is to provide the most
reliable electricity to all of its end users at a reasonable price. California’s grid is the
result of decades of experimentation and transformation. Within the United States, there
are a number of states in which electric markets are still vertically integrated. However,
California is not the only market in which the generation and distribution of electricity
are separated. States including Nevada, Arizona, and New York also use wholesale
markets to facilitate the sale of energy. Furthermore, the majority of service areas are
serviced by large, central grids, leaving only rural areas to be served by microgrids.
Understanding the basic technological complexities allow us to better grasp the
implications of current policy changes. Specifically, by looking at how the physical grid
and its regulation developed over time, we can better understand the debates over current
net metering policies.

The Central Grid Paradigm2
While electric utilities have existed for over a century, they have taken many
forms and advocated for a number of different (and sometimes contradictory) industry
policies. The current manifestation of electric utilities and the electric grid is often
described as the Central Grid Paradigm. This is characterized by a central grid—massive
power generation plants that are connected by a high-voltage transmission system. This
stands in stark contrast with proposals to decentralize the electricity system through the
development of microgrids (Walton, 2015). In order to fully understand the role of the
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electric utility in the current debate over DG solar resources, it is important to have a
sense of the history of electric utilities in the United States.
The defining characteristic of electric utilities to policy makers and economists
alike is the monopolistic structure that most utilities are granted. Utilities are considered
natural monopolies, due to the high fixed costs of providing service. While this has
certainly been true for the past many decades and is characteristic of almost all utilities
currently operating in the United States, this was not the case for their entire history.
When the first electric utilities began to operate, they did so in an intensively competitive
environment. At the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, the electric
industry was flooded with new investors. During this period, it was relatively common
for electric companies to engage in the production and sale of other electric components
in addition to pure energy. Some companies were even known for providing their
customers with light bulbs.
At this early stage of the industry, there were effectively no regulatory restraints
placed in regard to where utilities could operate or what type of customers they could
serve. The result was that multiple utilities often attempted to operate within the same
area, and would compete for the same customers. This form of competition drew many
utilities into densely populated, wealthy downtown areas, which contained the most
valuable customers. This over-investment of highly urban districts resulted in duplicate
capital investments from multiple companies. This was not only an extremely expensive
way to do business, but also immensely inefficient from a resource allocation perspective.
Over time, many utility companies could not continue to compete in this environment and
either dropped out of the market or began to consolidate with other firms.
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While competition is normally considered a necessary precondition for an
efficient market, in the early 1920s, the resulting duplicative grid infrastructure was
ultimately deemed to be “futile, chaotic, and destructive” (Peskoe, 2016, p. 11). This was
true to the extent that there were calls from the industry for the state to intervene and
place some limits on competition. Many utilities advocated for the establishment of state
sanctioned monopolies that would be regulated by a commission of highly competent and
educated officials. While giving up the freedom of a perfectly competitive market might
have required some sacrifices, the utilities had much to gain from this maneuver.
Granting monopoly status would greatly reduce the risk of investment and would
minimize concerns that potential investors had regarding the volatility of the industry.
This effective decrease in the cost of expansion would allow utilities to grow and invest
at an unprecedented rate.
Throughout the early 20th century, this form of governance and institution
regulation of utilities gained popularity across the country. Almost every state passed
legislation that provided some degree of protection for electric utilities. While in some
cases the designated service areas were technically non-exclusive, it mattered very little
and competition between utilities for the same customers was rare. So, even for utilities
that were not granted explicitly monopoly status, this period was marked by the
increasing tendency to grant electric utilities “de-facto monopolies” even in the absence
of exclusive service areas.
According to historian Richard Hirsh, this period of increased regulatory
oversight was indicative of a consensus that had been reached between the electric
industry, politicians, economists, and financiers of the electric industry. Each
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constituency stood to gain from the increasing oversight of the industry. For the utilities
that remained, the legitimization of their monopoly rights created a sense of stability,
predictability, and permanence. This solidification as the primary power provider allowed
them to raise more capital for their investment, as the risks to potential investors were
significantly decreased. However, it also was a means of decreasing the corruption that
was occurring on the municipal level and also granted regulators the ability to place some
limits on increasingly powerful companies. Finally, for many economists of the time, this
represented a shift towards increased efficiency. Many agreed that in the case of electric
utilities, a properly regulated monopoly would be more efficient than allowing perfect
competition. The high fixed costs and decreasing average costs associated with the
electric utility industry makes it incompatible with a competitive structure. The shift
towards a regulated monopoly structure prevented the splitting of the market, which
would have not only resulted in duplicate investments in transmission and distribution
infrastructure, but also would have acted as a barrier to firms in reaching economies of
scale.
This transition to regulated monopolies in the electric industry, largely completed
by the end of the first half of the 20th century, gave rise to the manifestation of utilities
with which we are now familiar. Not only did this movement represent a significant
increase in efficiency—decreasing the amount of energy needed to provide the same
service—but also radically changed the way that utilities approached their own operation.
While the increased efficiency provided some benefits to environmentalists, increased
pollution associated with higher levels of electricity consumption as well as a poorly
designed pricing structure resulted in continuing environmental damages. In this new
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form of regulation, many monopolies held either perfect or close to perfect monopolies
over the production and distribution of electricity. Hirsh also proposes that once exposed
to this, IOUs worked tirelessly to maintain their newfound control by encouraging
development of technologies that would preserve this system. Working closely with allies
in the manufacturing industry, IOUs “sought to stifle radical inventions that could upset
the central station paradigm and threaten established financial interests.” (Peskoe, 2016,
p. 16) While the pursuit of the central grid model proved to be wildly successful for
utilities, it also required capital on an unprecedented scale. This new sense of
predictability attracted large quantities of financial capital, and utilities were
unsurprisingly fixated on maintaining the conditions that would allow for their continued
growth. Another important characteristic of this period was an ever-increasing demand
for electricity. Resulting from both intentional programs developed by utilities as well as
the external trend towards increased electricity consumption, this resulted in steadily
increasing sales for electric utilities for a number of decades. This, along with steadily
decreasing electricity rates led regulators to not be overly concerned with the details of
the ratemaking process so long as customers continued to pay less and utilities were able
to capitalize on continuing investment opportunities. At the time, the structure of
recovering large fixed costs through volumetric rates posed little to no threat, however, it
set the stage for the challenges that we currently face regarding DG resources.

Principles of Ratemaking
In granting electric utilities de-facto monopolies over service areas, it was critical
that there was adequate regulatory oversight to ensure that customers were not taken
advantage of. The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is the primary regulatory body that
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is responsible for the oversight of the ratemaking process, but is often given little
guidance on how to determine if rates are acceptable. For over a century, strong
regulation has acted as a mechanism for setting prices in the absence of competition. As
Peskoe (2016) notes:
The foundational legal premise for this arrangement is that the IOU “was created
for public purposes [and] performs a function of the state.” As an instrument of
the state, it has unique authorities, such as the power to exercise eminent domain.
In turn, the government has a responsibility to ‘protect the people against
unreasonable charges for services rendered by [the IOU].’” (p. 10)
The purpose of this arrangement was to establish a rate of return for utilities that
they would have theoretically earned in the presence of competition. Rates therefore, are
set to allow the utility to cover the costs of providing electricity to the public while still
earning a reasonable return on their capital investments: generation, transmission, and
distribution capital. Under this paradigm, however, negative externalities in the
generation of electricirty are still largely ignored, preventing utilities and regulators from
reaching the most socially efficient outcome. By tying rates to utility costs, it was
theorized that utilizes would not be able to charge customers an unreasonable rate and
earn excessive profits. Additionally, under this structure, utilities were able to set
different rates for the different classes of customers—industrial, residential, and
commercial—to recover the costs that each class incurred. However, according to Peskoe
(2016), this newfound process created a sense of “false precision.” He claims that the
processes allowed for IUOs, along with other interested parties, to present their own cost
allocation studies. Consequently, each study either implicitly or explicitly promoted the
financial interests of its author, allowing regulators to choose between competing studies.
As a result, “regulators, courts, and economists have long-understood that allocating
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utility costs rests on ‘judgment,’ not science” (Peskoe, 2016, p. 10). In many cases, the
guidance to PUCs is simply that rates must be “just and reasonable” and not “unduly
discriminatory.” Over time, provisions for PUCs increased, and their role in regulating
utility rate setting became more pronounced.
This granted the PUCs the responsibility of making two key determinations. First,
they now had to be able to estimate the costs that a utility faced over a given year. This
would be used to project expected costs over the next period and would therefore inform
the revenue requirement that the utility was entitled to. Second, PUCs were now
responsible for overseeing the allocation of this revenue requirement between the
different classes of customers. Initially, utilities conducted Cost of Service Studies
(COSS) to advise the revenue requirement. However, by the 1960s, a consensus had
developed among economists that utilities should use marginal cost of service studies to
determine how the revenue requirement will be distributed among customer classes. That
is, instead of looking at the entire set of costs, one should look at the costs of providing
the next unit of electricity. This was a significant shift in ratemaking processes, as it
emphasized analyzing costs at the margin. It should be noted that while both COSS and
marginal COSS can be useful in advising rate design, they are both considered relatively
“subjective,” “imprecise,” and not accurate enough to calculate the precise cost of
providing service to a particular class. In an attempt to prevent discrimination, utilities
were forced to average costs across all residential customers and could not charge
individual residential customers different rates for providing the same service.
Consequently, some customers paid more than the costs associated with providing their
service while others were able to underpay. Many of the challenges are present in both
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COSS and marginal COSS methodology, as many costs to utilities cannot be accurately
attributed to a particular customer class. As James Bonbright—a foremost public utility
economist at the time—wrote: “the choice of formula depends, not on principles of cost
imputation but rather on types of apportionment which tend to justify whatever rate
structure is advocated for non-cost reasons” (Peskoe, 2016, p. 23).
More recently, there has been an increased desire among utility and PUC
regulators to attempt to align customer rates more closely with the costs that they incur
on the utility. Up until this point, most residential customers paid the same rates, and time
varying rates were not widely available. Analysts have a difficult time reaching
agreement on what type of COSS study to use (marginal or embedded) or on a
standardized methodology for allocating costs between customer classes. As a result,
analysts and regulators make judgment decisions that often stand to benefit their clients.
Peskoe (2016) argues that even if a consensus on methodology could be reached, the use
of time-invariant prices inherently means that customers are not paying the precise
amount that they are costing the utility. He concludes that “cross-subsidization between
ratepayers in the same class is thus a feature of electric utility rates” (p. 26). An
additional concern is the impact of negative environmental externalities on the
ratemaking process. Without an effective price on pollution, it will be excluded from cost
of service studies, and rates will be set below the socially efficient level.

Competitive Forces in a Monopolist’s World
At first glance, the arguments presented by utilities in the current Net Metering
2.0 case may seem to resemble those that were made in the middle of the 20th century.
The most direct connection is the argument that NEM creates cross subsidies between
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customer classes. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was the oil and gas companies that argued
against the programs of electric utilities, claiming that they were able to socialize the
costs across their entire customer base. In the current proceedings, it is now the electric
utilities invoking the same argument against NEM programs that support solar
installations. Nonetheless, there are major differences between the current and earlier
examples. The electric heating programs, for example, were able to recover some of their
costs through increased electricity sales. Of course, it is difficult to determine if this was
actually the case or simply an argument put forth by the electric utilities. The current
debate, however, cannot make this claim. In the 1960s, utilities claimed that the increased
electricity sales resulting from customers switching from gas to electric heating offset the
costs of their incentive programs. Now, however, instead of increasing electricity sales,
the installation of solar decreases them, making it impossible for fixed costs to be
recovered in the same way. Utilities claim that these cross subsidies are unacceptable and
should be entirely avoided. However, Peskoe (2016) would argue that these types of
cross subsidies are inherent to the ratemaking process. Additionally, utilities are now
required by law to provide service to their customers, which was not true during the
middle of the 20th century. The few similarities between the current net metering case and
the programs provided by electric utilities in the middle of the 20th century provide some
insight into current policy discussions.
The electric utility industry described above has existed primarily in an
environment of government-sanctioned monopoly model. Most recently, as many
consumer and environmental advocates have placed increasing pressure on the need for a
cleaner energy supply, this deeply rooted power structure is being challenged. In many
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places across the United States, utilities are finding that their customers are increasingly
seeking to generate their own energy. The most animated debate in this regard concerns
the rapid expansion of DG solar technologies. In California, this phenomenon is
particularly salient, as the state has the largest growth of rooftop solar in the country
(Association, 2015). For many within the utility industry, this is simply an issue that must
be addressed as they continue to operate under the central grid paradigm. However, there
are discussions among many constituencies as to what degree the expansion of DG solar,
along with other renewable technologies, will impact the ability of utilities to continue to
operate under the central grid paradigm. Not only are these technologies allowing
customers to purchase energy from other sources, but it is also disrupting the way that
utilities are used to recovering costs of transmission.
Many recognize the increasing presence of distributed solar as a form of
competition. Understanding the implications of this transition can be informed by
examining moments in history when there were similar introductions of competitive
forces. Throughout the past century, there were three periods during which competition
was introduced into the utility industry, both from within and from external sources.
These examples are not exactly analogous to the current situation, as utilities are now
legally required to provide service to all their customers, and are subject to heavy
regulation. Previous instances of competition, nonetheless, provide a useful perspective
on current policies, demonstrating some of the regulatory challenged that exist in an
industry characterized by high fixed costs.
In the late 1940s and through the 1960s, in the aftermath of World War II, electric
utilities saw massive increases in electricity sales and consumption, growing at an
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average rate of 9% annually between 1949 and 1969 (Peskoe, 2016). This was partially
due to the deliberate effort of utilities to persuade customers to use electricity not just for
lighting, but also for heating and hot water. They did so by providing customers with
electric appliances as well as by offering rebates to customers who switched to electric
heating. This horizontal expansion brought electric utilities into services that had
previously been provided by local oil and gas distributors. This newfound competition
was hardly welcomed by the oil and gas companies, who claimed that the utilities’ efforts
to expand into their service markets constituted an unfair overreach.
This conflict was made worse as utilities intensified their efforts to increase the
role of electric power in the American home. To start, utilities began to leverage their
connections with the manufacturing industry to promote the concept of the “total electric
home.” These efforts did not stop at simply promoting products. In many cases, utilities
would offer homebuilders rebates or free services in exchange for constructing homes
with electric heat and hot water installed. A more popular approach was to offer rebates
to customers who would make those types of improvements on their own homes. The
utilities were able to capitalize on the fact that electric homes used 2.5-3 times as much
energy as their nonelectric counterparts, which would increase their sales for decades to
come. These changes resulted in significantly higher demand for electricity. In doing this,
electric utilities were not only able to promote the transition to electric homes, but were
also able to spread the costs of these programs across all of their customers.
Oil and gas distributors saw this as a form of unfair competition on the part of
electric utilities. Throughout the late 1960s, they often took their complaints to Public
Utilities Commissions across the countries, hoping to gain protection through regulation.
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Their claim was that the use of promotional subsidies to electric heating constituted
unfair competitive strategies. Unfortunately for them, their complaints were met with
little to no response on the part of regulatory bodies. In fact, many commissions found
their complaints to be distasteful. As Commissioner Arthur L. Padrutt responded:
We see a growing number of cases where unregulated industries invoke the
regulatory process against their utility competition. They would use regulation to
inhibit competition against themselves while remaining free to compete as they
please. As a regulator, I find this a distasteful trend. It amounts to a perversion of
the regulatory process and should be sharply resisted (Moore, 1967, p. 16).
Despite these complaints, the golden age of electric utilities continued through the
1960s. A combination of the achievement of economies of scale, along with a number of
legal and regulatory victories allowed electric utilities to greatly increase their customer
base and sales volumes. Electric utilities, which were used to experiencing peak demand
during the winter months, now found that in many parts of the country the peak demand
was shifting to the summer months. The prevalence of air conditioning technologies
along with a population that increasingly demanded temperature controlled environments
vastly increased electricity use during the summer months across the country.
At the time, many electric utilities were responsible for both the generation and
transmission of electricity. The shift of peak loads from the winter to summer months
meant that a large portion of their infrastructure sat idle for many months of the year.
Supposedly, they set their research and sales teams to work to find innovative methods
for increasing the utilization of their facilities and subsequently increase sales. In an
attempt to increase winter electricity sales, many electricity companies turned to electric
heating as the obvious first choice (Moore, 1967).
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Oil distributors took issue with the practice of subsidized electric heaters and filed
numerous complaints claiming that utilities had an unfair advantage because electric
utilities could recover the costs of these programs through the ratemaking process. These
complaints often failed in state legislatures, as IOUs were able to argue that these
subsidies were good for the customer base as a whole, allowing them to lower costs
further by achieving further economies of scale.
After being turned away from the vast majority of state legislatures, the oil and
gas companies began to file complaints under the guise of disenfranchised customers.
They claimed that they were facing unfair discrimination by these programs and that they
were being forced to recoup the costs associated with providing subsidies. This, they
argued, amounted to a cross subsidy that they did not feel they should pay (Moore, 1967).
They further claimed that “forcing existing customers to subsidize new customers
amounted to unjust or undue discrimination, which is generally prohibited by state law”
(Peskoe, 2016, p. 37).
As discussed above, the majority of state legislatures sided with the electric
utilities, and refused to act on the complaints of the gas companies. Most regulatory
bodies denied that the promotions offered by electric utilities were unlawfully
discriminatory, and also upheld the programs on different grounds. In the most striking
case, coming out of Delaware, the commission upheld the utility’s programs—a decision
that was widely influential in subsequent cases across the country (Moore, 1967). The
logic of the commissioner was that the programs were justified because of the disparity
between summer and winter peak loads (P.S.S., 1964):
The primary motive for a promotional campaign for electric heating was
claimed to arise from a disproportionate demand for electrical current during
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summer months. This demand, generally resulting from increased use of air
conditioning, has been met by electric utilities through the expansion of
generating and transmission facilities. These same facilities, however, are not
utilized to their fullest during winter months. […] In an effort to utilize this idle
generating capacity, electric utilities have commenced a program of aggressive
promotion of electric usage. Since the expansion of most home appliances is
limited by market forces, it was determined that recent advances in the technology
of home heating provided a basis for new sales of electric current. It was felt that
a successful entrance upon the heating scene of a new fuel required the use of
certain inducements to entice customers away from traditional fuels, such as
oil and gas....
The amounts of the promotional allowance was based upon a balancing of
various factors. The amount must be sufficiently large to be attractive as well as
compensatory for additional cost on the one hand, and still bear a reasonable
economic relationship to the increase in revenue to be expected from the
additional current expended. (
Another common target of oil and gas companies’ complaints was the practice of
installing underground electric wires to provide service to customers. Many electric
utilities developed programs incentivizing the transition from overhead to underground
wiring to accommodate increased electric demand from new electric appliances. At the
time, customers preferred to have underground wiring, but the costs associated with this
technology were often prohibitive. The programs that utilities established provided
financial incentives for customers to decide to receive service via these underground
cables (Moore, 1967). Through these programs, electric utilities were able to remove
another barrier to converting more customers to electric heat and water heaters. This
further angered oil and gas companies that viewed this as an unfair subsidy to convince
customers to convert from gas to electricity.
In both cases, the utilities claimed that these programs were justifiable for a
number of reasons. First, they argued that they were in the general interest of the
public—a view that was largely supported by utility commissions across the country. The
main premise of regulators was that by increasing the load factor of their facilities, the
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electric utilities could decrease the unit costs associated with providing service to their
customers. So, the electric utilities were supported so long as they could argue that their
programs would decrease the costs of providing service to customers in the long run.
Additionally, some commissioners claimed that it would be an abuse of their
power to intervene and prevent the utilities from implementing their programs. They
were often satisfied so long as utilities demonstrated that the increase in electricity sales
would offset the costs of the programs. One court concluded that utilities are “engaged in
vigorous competition with suppliers of other forms of fuel or energy [and] that a business
either grows or decays and when it is allowed to disintegrate, there is damage to
customers as well as to stockholders” (Gifford v. Central Maine Power Company, 1966,
para. 8).
While Public Utilities Commissions are responsible for preventing utility
companies from charging unreasonable rates, it appears that in many instances, they have
intervened to ensure the success of the central grid. Although this is not included in the
PUC’s objective function, their decisions to intervene (or not) were instrumental in the
success of electric utilities converting customers to electric heating. The tendency of
PUCs to protect the central grid paradigm might suggest that they would side with the
interests of electric utilities claiming that rooftop solar would disrupt their ability to
provide reliable service. However, net metering is not the only incentive available to
those who wish to install rooftop solar in California. This debate is situated within
California’s web of renewable energy policies, as it has developed as a leader in climate
and energy policy.
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II.

Renewable Energy Policy in California
For many years, California has been on the cutting edge of climate and

environmental policy. As the world’s 8th largest economy California has earned its place
amongst world economies and is now looked to as a source of inspiration and guidance
for many countries seeking to implement effective climate policies. California has long
been recognized as a subnational actor tackling a global challenge, providing valuable
policy insights to groups throughout the United States and across the globe (Mazmanian,
Jurewitz, & Nelson, 2008). The most overarching intervention was the passing of
Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, the primary goals of
which include: 1) reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, 2)
developing a scoping plan to meet new targets, and 3) regulating a number of GHGs,
including, CO2 (Adams, Nichols, & Goldstene, 2008).
While this policy does not explicitly create mandates for the electricity sector, it
set the stage for a slough of policies that would target specific aspects of the generation,
transmission, and end-use consumption of electricity. The California Public Utilities
Commission, the California Energy Commission, and a number of other state agencies
are responsible for establishing programs that create incentives for the installation,
development, and purchase of renewable energy. This has largely been an attempt to
correct for the un-priced positive externality of avoided pollution that is associated with
renewable generation. However, in the absence of a singular agency or institution
responsible for guiding renewable energy programs, California has developed an
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extremely complex system of over 13 programs targeting different renewable
technologies (Rogers & Stueve, 2012). This has resulted in a system that is inefficient,
difficult for the public to understand, and one with overlapping jurisdictions. With no
single agency responsible for overseeing the direction of renewable energy policies or
identifying regulatory gaps, this patchwork of programs will continue to provide less than
ideal results (Jeremy Carl, Dian Grueneich, David Fedor, n.d.). Figure 1 illustrates the
scope and complexity of renewable energy programs within California.
Figure	
  1:	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Programs	
  in	
  California	
  (Rogers	
  &	
  
Stueve,	
  2012)

While AB32 set long-term goals for emissions reductions, the specific targets for
individual sectors (industrial, residential, commercial, etc.) were not included. For the
electric sector, this gap was filled by the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS). This
legislation sets requirements for regulated retail sellers of electricity to purchase a certain
percentage of their energy from eligible sources of renewable energy. The first RPS was
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set in 2002, prior to the passage of AB32, and required CPUC regulated retail sellers of
electricity—primarily Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs)—to purchase an additional 1%
per year from renewable sources until 20% of sales were reached in 2017. For
environmentalists and those interested in energy conservation, this represented a
significant step in the right direction, as IOUs provided approximately 68% of retail
electric sales (Rogers & Stueve, 2012).
The next modification to the RPS came with the passage of Senate Bill 107 in
2006. SB 107, implemented during the same year as AB32, demonstrated an increasing
commitment to meeting climate goals, demanding a 20% RPS goal by 2010. The most
recent modification to the RPS program took place in 2011, when the standard was
increased from 20% to a 33% goal by 2020 for regulated retail sellers and publicly owned
utilities (Rogers & Stueve, 2012). In meeting the goals set out by the RPS standards, all
investor owned utilities are required to submit annual plans on how they plan to make
progress on reaching the standards.
To keep track of how much renewable energy is generated and purchased by
individual entities, the California Energy Commission uses Renewable Energy Credits
(RECs). One REC is a certificate of proof of generation of one MWh from an eligible
renewable source. In the simplest cases, the REC is bundled with the energy that it is
associated with. Alternatively, RECs can be sold as unbundled commodities, where the
energy itself is not purchased. This degree of flexibility allows sellers of retail electricity
to meet their targets under the RPS at a lower cost. These unbundled RECs, also referred
to as Tradable RECs (TRECs), can be traded amongst firms in a secondary market,
providing a further degree of flexibility. Tradable RECs ensure that the renewable
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generation exists, but does not necessarily have to be delivered by the same utility. This
however, does not account for reduced sales resulting from energy efficiency
improvements. Investments in energy efficiency are managed under different programs,
largely targeting end users of electricity.
However, there are some limits placed on the freedom of retail electricity sellers
to source RECs to meet RPS goals. SB X1 2 (which established the 2011 RPS standard)
also lays out requirements for the types of RECs that entities in the electricity market can
utilize. Minimum requirements are set for the proportion of bundled RECs that must be
purchased, while a cap (as a percentage) is placed on how many unbundled RECs can be
used to meet RPS goals (Rogers & Stueve, 2012). This prevents utilities from simply
purchasing their entire requirement through unbundled RECs, but not actually having to
deliver renewable energy to end-use customers.
While California currently has 13 programs designated to increase the role of
renewables in our energy mix, there are four policies that specifically target small scale
distributed solar resources (i.e., energy produced by individual home owners who install
solar panels): the California Solar Initiative, the New Solar Homes Partnership, the
Emerging Renewables Program, and Net Energy Metering. These programs were
instituted to encourage solar systems that provide energy “behind the meter”—that is, the
electricity is produced and consumed on the customer side of the meter. Because the
energy is largely consumed directly by the customer’s home, utilities are unable to
measure how much was produced. Energy that is generated by rooftop solar that directly
serves a customer’s on-site consumption may not be counted towards the utility’s RPS
requirement. However, when generation surpasses consumption and energy is sold back
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to the grid, the utility may count this excess generation towards their RPS requirement.
Additionally, the installation of a residential solar system will decrease the amount of
electricity that the customer requires from the grid. Since the RPS obligation is expressed
as a percentage of retail sales, this decrease in sales reduces the total amount of
renewable energy that is required for the utility to meet the RPS target. This is a
relatively small effect, and is much less significant than if the utility could simply count
DG generation towards their RPS requirements.
The California Solar Initiative (CSI), one of the most significant policies, was
originally developed in 2005 by an executive order of Governor Schwarzenegger. After
passing over a number of regulatory hurdles, the program was adopted by the CPUC in
December, 2006, and was launched at the beginning of 2007 (Rogers & Stueve, 2012).
The goal of the program was to increase the generation from solar resources as well as
assist solar installations in achieving economies of scale so that they could continue to
develop independently. The original target was to reach 1940 MW of installed solar
capacity by 2016. This program specifically targeted customers served by Pacific Gas &
Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric, representing
approximately 70% of electric customers in the state (California Solar Initiative Program
Handbook, 2014).
The program was designed to target residential systems as small as 1 kW capacity
up through systems of 1000 kW (1MW)—which could fit on the roof of a large store.
The CSI built on nearly a decade of previous solar policies, including the Emerging
Renewables Program and the Million Solar Roofs Program (California Solar Initiative
Program Handbook, 2014; Rogers & Stueve, 2012). The CSI also included a number of
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separate initiatives, each administered independently. These included a research,
development, and deployment (RD&D) program which targeted solar technologies that
furthered the goals laid out by the CSI and dedicated $50 million to such technologies.
Additionally, programs targeting low-income customers were administered separately,
and were allocated budgets of $108 million to encourage solar growth in single and
multifamily low-income housing units (Rogers & Stueve, 2012). The lack of coordination
among programs has been consistently cited as one of the main weaknesses in
California’s efforts to expand renewable energy (Jeremy Carl, Dian Grueneich, David
Fedor, n.d.)
The CSI ended almost two years ahead of schedule, with the final funds being
spent in 2014. However, the early termination and decline in available rebates is not an
indication that this program was a failure. To the contrary, the CSI exceeded its initial
target by hundreds of megawatts. Additionally, the fact that the program terminated with
little windfall or media noise demonstrates that it achieved its goal of helping solar
installations reach the necessary scale needed to operate more or less on their own.
Unlike other states and countries that have rolled back solar subsidies and witnessed a
decline in installations, the decline of CSI actually coincided with increasing solar
installations throughout the state. This was made possible by other state and federal tax
credits and incentives. The percentage of residential installations receiving state
incentives through the CSI declined steadily between 2012 and 2014, allowing the
program to be slowly phased out (Lacey, 2014). While the CSI was instrumental in the
initial rise in rooftop solar, now that it has concluded, other programs will have to be used
to provide incentives for rooftop solar. Net metering is the policy that has primarily filled
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this gap, and continues to provide the greatest incentives for those who install rooftop
solar.
The New Solar Homes Partnership (NSHP), a program established in the context
of the CSI, was designed to target solar installations on new housing units. (Arriaga,
Nasim, & Nguyen, 2015). This program provides incentives for new residential buildings
that purchase energy from the state’s IOUs, with different incentive structures for marketrate housing projects and qualified affordable housing projects (Rogers & Stueve, 2012).
Most of the incentives come in the form of rebates, and are determined by the size of the
solar installation. They range from $0.75/watt to $1.50/watt, depending on the type of
housing unit and other energy efficiency certifications of the unit. Currently, the NSHP
has helped finance almost 150 MW of solar capacity on new housing units (“New Solar
Homes Partnership,” 2016). The CSI and NSHP provided direct incentives for the
installation of solar, but did not provide compensation for the actual generation. While
this was effective in promoting the initial expansion of solar, we now must look to
policies that encourage the generation of solar energy, not just installation. Net metering
is the policy that provides such an incentive and will also likely be the longest lasting.
Net Energy Metering (NEM) has been one of the most popular programs for
encouraging the growth of DG solar in most states, particularly in California. While
many of the other programs in California have either begun to be phased out or have
ended completely, NEM is still considered necessary to make solar a financially viable
option for residential customers (Lacey, 2014). NEM is one of the oldest standing
policies targeting renewable energy in California. It was originally established in 1995
under California Public Utilities Code 2827 to provide net metering for wind and solar
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systems with capacities less than 10 kW. In 2001, net metering was expanded to include
projects up to 1 MW in size, and again expanded in 2003 to develop a program targeting
biogas digesters and fuel cell technologies.
NEM is designed to provide customers with an incentive to install onsite
renewable power systems. The vast majority of customers that utilize net energy metering
are those with rooftop solar systems. NEM allows customers use the grid when their solar
systems do not generate enough to meet their demand, but also requires utilities to buy
excess generation from solar customers when their production is greater than
consumption. Most of the time, the energy generated from rooftop solar is used to
directly service the needs of the household. However, when the generation exceeds the
customer’s demand, the utility must buy this energy, and the customer receives a credit
on their bill. Customers usually do not receive actual cash payments, but rather receive
credits for their energy bills for a given billing period. At the end of the 12-month billing
period, customers are billed for their total energy use minus the credits from excess
generation.
While many of these policies were targeted to increase the deployment of rooftop
solar, utility scale solar facilities also offer similar benefits. Utility scale solar is normally
bought and sold in the wholesale market, and is usually a much less expensive
investment. In some cases, utility scale plants can be 50% less expensive per kWh than
an equivalent capacity in rooftop generation (Tsuchida et al., 2015). While it is still
important to incentivize the installation of rooftop solar, we should also be mindful of
deploying solar resources in the most cost effective way possible.
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While NEM has been considered an extremely successful program, imposing it on
the pre-existing rate structure effectively punished utilities, which relied on volumetric
sales to recover their costs. For this reason, IOUs such as PG&E have not only been
hesitant to embrace net metering, but have aggressively fought to end it. Part of this
problem is due to the lack of time-of-use metering, which would more accurately
compensate rooftop solar generators for their energy. However, even with time varying
prices, utilities would still be reliant on using volumetric rates to recover fixed costs.
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III. Creating a Sustainable Path for Solar
Concerns over Rooftop Solar
While policies such as the ones described in Chapter 2 have succeeded in
increasing distributed solar capacity, this expansion has still occurred within a system
that was not intended to facilitate bidirectional energy sales. As distributed solar
resources (primarily rooftop solar) become increasingly prevalent in California, utilities
have begun to cite them as a potential threat to business and regulatory models that must
be dealt with immediately (Kind, 2013; Owens, 2012). At current levels, rooftop solar
may not pose an imminent threat to the viability utilities operating and maintaining the
grid, but with predictions of sharp declines in the price of solar technology and rapid
increases in installations, the influence of DG solar will definitely increase in years to
come. For decades, utilities have built the grid largely to deliver electricity to end
customers—it was never designed to have electricity flow in the other direction. At low
levels of penetration, customers selling energy back to the grid—creating a system in
which electricity flows both directions—does not pose extreme problems, but as the
volumes of electricity flowing back into the grid increase, many utilities are concerned
about both technological and cost recovery issues that may arise. Addressing the issues
associated with the recovery of grid and transmission costs now will allow solar to
continue to grow without these concerns as it reaches higher levels of penetration.
In the case of electricity generation, a large number of companies are able to
compete to sell their energy in the same market (CAISO). However, the business of
electricity distribution has a dramatically different set of characteristics. As outlined in
Chapter 1, the period of competition in the distribution market proved to be a dramatic
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failure, and has since been converted largely to monopolies. Because the transmission
system requires such massive capital investments in the grid infrastructure, it would not
make sense to have multiple transmission networks providing service to the same set of
customers. Instead, the regulatory body grants a utility monopoly rights to a service area.
The regulatory body is then responsible for ensuring that electricity prices are kept
relatively close to the cost of service. The transmission system is responsible for
providing a way to transport electricity from the generating source to the end use
customer. Thus, electric utilities must provide service to the customers in their area as
well as recover the costs of constructing and maintaining the grid along with the cost of
purchasing generated electricity.
In order to ensure reliable and high quality service, the transmission system must
be sized correctly to be able to handle the maximum load that will be demanded of it.
Each part of the system is generally designed so that its minimum capacity is determined
by the highest load that it must be able to accommodate (also including a margin of
error). In this way, the costs of the transmission system increase as the amount of
capacity it requires increases. Because the transmission system is largely influenced by
its maximum load, the impact that a single customer has on the necessary size (and
consequently the cost) of the system is determined largely by the customer’s portion of
the substation peaks. The majority of the costs that are incurred to the distribution system
are derived from infrastructure and are largely fixed in the short run (Cicchetti, Dubin, &
Long, 2004).
These types of costs can be characterized by whether or not they vary with
customer size or load. First, there are some fixed costs that do not change with the
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customer size or load. It is important to note that the concept of fixed costs is often
interpreted differently in the utility setting. Some will refer to fixed costs as those that
truly do not vary with the customer size. This definition would mainly include billing,
metering, customer service, and administrative costs. In this sense, the behavior of
individual customers has no effect on these costs, although the utility may attempt to
lower them by increasing their efficiency in the long run (Cicchetti et al., 2004).
Alternatively, there are also a few types of costs that do vary with customer
characteristics. The first type varies with the total amount of energy used by the
customer. That is to say that the potential load of the customer requires certain
infrastructure investments. For example, a customer that uses all her electric appliances
simultaneously will require a larger connection than one who spreads that same use out
over the course of a day. These differences in customer size are reflected by the
difference in cost of connecting a large mansion versus a small residence. In fact, some
utilities (e.g. Salt River Project in Arizona) have attempted to isolate these costs by
charging customers a fee that is determined by their amp service. In addition to costs that
vary with customer size, there are also those that are largely determined by the peak load
of the customer. In order to provide reliable service, a utility must make infrastructure
investments sufficient to cover the maximum load that they anticipate experiencing.
Depending on regional characteristics, the peak electrical demand is influenced not only
by the time of day, but also the time of year. As this peak demand changes, utilities can
expand or contract the size of the distribution system. However, costs associated with
accommodating changes in system demand are considered fixed in the short run, but may
be adjusted in the long run. In the short run, utilities cannot change the size of the
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distribution system, but they are able to accommodate changes in peak demand by
modifying the size of the grid over longer time horizons. These distinctions may seem
trivial, but are central to many discussions of cost recovery. Many scholars who study
electric utilities cite a need to recover costs by charging customers for the costs that they
incur. In order to do so, one must first have a basic understanding of the different types of
costs.
Historically, utilities have recovered the majority of their costs through
volumetric ($/kWh) charges. Customers are simply billed for the total amount of energy
used, with little to no regard for how or when it is consumed. In a growing system, this
straightforward method of pricing was beneficial for both the customer and electric
utility: it accounted for an increasing revenue stream as sales continued to grow, while
simultaneously simplifying the bill that the customer received. It also gave customers a
very clear signal of “use less, pay less/use more, pay more.” More recently, utilities have
begun to experiment with different rate structures, but still primarily rely on some form
of volumetric rates to recover their costs.
With the expansion of DG resources and storage technologies, many within the
industry have become increasingly concerned with the implications for cost recovery.
Originally, this simple form of billing may have been adequate, but as distributed
generation continues to expand, recovering fixed costs through volumetric rates will
result in an inefficient outcome. Customers utilizing DG resources pay significantly less
in volumetric rates due to decreased consumption. However, as described above, utilities
size the transmission system based on instantaneous demand (kW), not volumetric
demand (kWh). Additionally, as we shall see in Chapter 4, the absence of un-priced
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environmental externalities further decreases the efficiency of this rate structure. Figure 2
illustrates how adopting solar technologies impacts the characteristics of a customer, with
their maximum demand remaining the same while volumetric usage falls sharply. Figure
3 depicts the implications of these changes for the recovery of fixed costs through
volumetric rates for electric utilities.

Figure 2: Average Monthly Demand and Energy Use (Arizona Public Service)

Source: Arizona Public Service
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Figure 3: Effects of Solar on Costs and Revenues (Feb. 9, 2015, Special Board Meeting, S.J. Hulet & M.B.
Bonsall)

This demonstrates how a customer who switches to solar dramatically decreases
their volumetric energy usage, while their maximum demand remains relatively
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unchanged. Because utilities rely on volumetric rates to recover the fixed costs of grid
investments, the drop in energy use associated with solar installations results in
unrecovered grid costs. Under net metering programs, the reduction in energy use
translates directly to a reduction of revenue for the electric utility.

Current Regulatory Proceedings
AB 327
One of the most prominent manifestations of the economic conflicts between
solar advocacy groups and utility advocates is the discussion of net metering practices.
This is exemplified in a case that has recently come before the California Public Utilities
Commission, and emerged from the passage of AB 327 in 2013. Net metering was
originally intended to encourage the installation and utilization of DG renewable
resources. Under current3 (Net Metering 1.0) net metering policies, customers who are
eligible for the program are able to receive full retail credit for the energy that they
produce. However, there was no accompanying rate structure change that occurred with
the implementation of this program. In order to qualify for the program, a customer is
limited to operating a “small” renewable facility, which has been capped at 1MW of
generating capacity. Customers are able to receive the retail rates for the energy produced
by being charged for their net energy use—hence net energy metering. By only charging
customers for the energy use in excess of their generation, they are effectively
compensated at the rate at which they would have purchased electricity from the grid. In
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3	
  Throughout	
  this	
  piece,	
  I	
  will	
  refer	
  to	
  policies	
  in	
  place	
  before	
  the	
  NEM	
  2.0	
  case	
  as	
  
“current.”	
  Because	
  this	
  is	
  being	
  written	
  while	
  the	
  proceedings	
  are	
  still	
  underway,	
  it	
  
is	
  important	
  to	
  make	
  this	
  clarification.	
  Any	
  policy	
  or	
  legislation	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  the	
  
result	
  of	
  NEM	
  2.0	
  shall	
  be	
  identified	
  as	
  such.	
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California, the vast majority of customers that participate in NEM are those who have
installed small solar arrays on their homes or businesses (CAPUC, 2014b).
For nearly two decades now, modifications to the NEM program in California
have usually focused on the types of energy that can qualify and limits that are placed on
the number of participants in the program. The current limits on net metering were
established by Pub. Util. Code 2827(c)(4)(B), which set the limit for net metering under
IOUs at 5% of the aggregate customer peak demand. This cap was established to prevent
unknown consequences of high levels of bidirectional electricity flow between the grid
and DG systems. As of 2013, the cap for net metering (measured by the peak demand of
customers) was 5258MW, but only 1882MW were enrolled in the net metering program
(36% of the cap) (Heeter, Gelman, & Bird, 2014). This program was originally intended
to only allow a relatively small number of households to participate, but the PUC is
currently attempting to craft a policy that would have no cap on participation.
The most recent legislation regarding NEM in California is Assembly Bill 327
(AB 327), passed by Governor Brown in October 2013. AB 327 gives the Public Utilities
Commission the authority to “address current electricity rate inequities, protect low
income energy users and maintain robust incentives for renewable energy investments.”4
AB 327 has a number of directives that specifically address the pricing of electricity in
the context of solar production: 1) ensure that renewable energy generation on customer
sites continues to grow sustainably, 2) new tariffs are established on the basis of actual
costs and benefits of renewable energy generation, and 3) “ensure that the total benefits
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of the standard contract or tariff to all customers and the electrical system are
approximately equal to the total costs” (E. Brown, 2013, p. 91).
In addition to these primary directives, SB 327 states that the commission pay
special attention to low-income customers who are participating in the California
Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE) program. The bill mandates that in assessing new
rates, these customers not be unduly burdened. Most of the installed capacity is on homes
that are owner occupied. Not only do these customers tend to be higher income, but
people who rent their homes may not have the authority to install solar at all. While SB
327 opens the door for utilities to propose fixed charges to recover some of the costs, it
also states that in doing so, along with any rate changes, the changes “do not
unreasonably impair incentives for conservation and energy efficiency, and do not
overburden low-income and moderate-income customers” (E. Brown, 2013). Lowincome customers a especially effected by rate changes, so it is important to take care to
not adversely impact them.
The most pertinent part of this legislation is the language regarding the
development of a successor to the current NEM program. The legislation aims to enable a
net metering tariff that would expand on the current program and would be a long-term
policy for residential customers wishing to install DG resources. This reflects the rapidly
increasing rate at which renewable technologies are being installed in California—the
conditions of the DG landscape have changed radically since the first manifestation of the
NEM program. AB 327 mandates that the PUC establish a successor to the current NEM
program by December 31, 2015 (released February 5, 2016). The new contract or tariff
must be made available to customers of large electrical corporations starting July 1, 2017,
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or if ordered to begin by the PUC because the utility has reached the NEM program limit
(E. Brown, 2013). The bill also specifies that the contract or tariff approved by the
commission shall be available to all eligible. In this way, one of the primary purposes of
this legislation is to provide a form of NEM that will be more viable in the long run, one
that will not limit the number of customer-generators.
Net Metering 2.0
Leading up to this proceeding, which began in July 2014, decisions made in other
commission cases have been reached that have implications for Net Metering 2.0 moving
forward. Specifically, D.15-07-001 (July 2015) resulted in a number of changes to both
residential rate design and the process that the PUC must follow in the Net Metering 2.0
case. The most relevant changes include: 1) A modification of the current four-tiered
residential rate structure that will narrow it to two-tiers by 2019, 2) the implementation of
minimum bills for customers instead of fixed charges, 3) a ruling that fixed charges
(including demand charges) will not be imposed until the process of streamlining the
tiered rates has completed and time of use rates have been implemented, 4) establishing
that the consideration of fixed charges must be initiated in an IOUs rate case, and 5) the
development of time of use rates for residential customers that will launch pilot programs
in summer 2016 (CAPUC, 2014a). The tiered pricing structure allows utilities to charge
different prices for energy depending on how much a customer uses. The higher tiers are
usually much more expensive, incentivizing customers to reduce the amount of energy
that they use. The changes represent a significant shift towards a more efficient rate
structure. In the current proceedings developing a successor to the NEM tariff, the
commission is mindful of the dramatic changes that will be taking place over the next
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few years and has expressed concern for instituting dramatic changes to the NEM
program without fully understanding the impacts on customer bills or utilities (CAPUC,
2014a).
The current proceeding is the result of AB 327. While there have been a number
of other proceedings that address specific aspects of NEM, many of them were
consolidated under this case to make it easier to coordinate the decisions. At its
commencement, it was anticipated that through this case, the PUC would identify a
number of key elements necessary to move forward with a new NEM program, as well as
propose a NEM tariff that would succeed the current policies. The commission is
anticipated to: 1) identify guiding principles that would assist in developing and
evaluating options for NEM successors, 2) identify “program elements” and features that
could be included in a proposed program, 3) develop a method for estimating the costs
and benefits of various policy options (the “Public Tool”), and 4) develop a number of
options for a NEM successor program (CAPUC, 2014b).
In the past year, other states have had similar proceedings in their respective
Public Utilities Commissions. In Nevada, the Public Utility Commission released a
decision that dramatically cut the state’s net metering program. Prior to the decision,
Nevada had experienced a “solar gold rush,” and was one of the largest installers of
rooftop solar in the country (Brady, 2016). The recent decision, however, dealt a
devastating blow to the solar industry, which “pretty much killed off residential solar in
Nevada” (Brady, 2016, p. 2).
The proposed changes include increasing fixed charges for solar customers from
$12.75/month to $38.51/month by 2020, and reducing the rate at which customers can
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sell energy to the grid from $0.11/kWh to $0.026/kWh over the same period (Pyper,
2016). For many customers who see average bill savings of $11 to $15 per month from
installing solar, the increase in fixed charges alone would offset any savings (Pyper,
2015). As a result, many solar companies have been forced to reduce or eliminate their
business operations in Nevada.
In its decision, the PUC argued that these reduced rates more accurately reflect
the costs and benefits associated with serving solar customers. Additionally, the changes
to the Nevada rate structure apply to a large number of existing solar customers, who had
made the decision based on much higher levels of compensation. Whether on not this
change in rate structure increases the efficiency of rooftop solar, it is clear that it has
dramatically reduced the viability of solar in the state.
Fortunately, California legislators have been able to use the Nevada experience as
a tool for understanding the implications of making significant changes to existing
policies. This further demonstrates the importance of net metering as an incentive for
customers to install rooftop solar, but also the impacts of introducing a high degree of
uncertainty for customers who sell their energy back to the grid.
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IV. Proposed Changes
In the California proceeding of Net Metering 2.0 various parties have been asked
to submit proposals for a successor tariff to the current net metering program. These
proposals can be grouped into four main categories: 1) those that keep the current form of
NEM, providing full retail rate credits to customers with onsite generation, 2) those that
maintain full retail compensation for NEM, but add a demand charge or installed capacity
charge (a type of fixed charge), 3) those that allow customers to use onsite generation for
direct usage, but receive compensation for exported electricity at less than the retail
rates5, and 4) those that establish a “value of renewables” tariff, under which customers
are credited for the “avoided cost” to the utilities resulting from their onsite generation
(CAPUC, 2014a). Within these categories, the majority of solar advocacy groups
proposed rates similar to (1) in which customers would continue to receive full retail rate
net metering for their generated energy.
Pacific Gas & Electric submitted a proposal similar to (3), allowing customers to
receive compensation for generated power at rates less than retail prices, while also being
subject to demand or capacity charges (CAPUC, 2016). PG&E suggests that customers
under their NEM program be compensated for the generation rate that they pay on their
bills, approximately $0.097/kWh, significantly less than the current retail rate that
customers receive.6 Under their proposed tariff, customers would also be charged a
demand charge, calculated using a customer’s period of maximum demand. California
utilizes a competitive bidding process to allow utilities to acquire generation from
different energy sources. While each generator may offer a different price, the market	
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clearing price is ultimately the price that is paid for every unit of electricity at that time,
regardless of the generation type. Thus, even though the marginal cost of operating a
solar facility is almost zero, the energy sold (if not already contracted) is sold at the
market clearing price.
This approach would reduce the current problem of recovering fixed costs
through volumetric rates. One of the reasons that customers currently receive such high
rates for generated electricity is the high share of fixed costs that are included in the
volumetric rates that they pay. Splitting a customer’s bill into a demand charge and
volumetric rates would attempt to minimize this. Demand charges are not new. They
have commonly been implemented with commercial and industrial customers, although
some utilities have begun to roll out demand charges for their residential customers. The
proposed demand charge would be used to recover the distribution costs that a customer
incurs to the grid. Since utilities are forced to size distribution to meet customer peak
demand, this charge would represent these costs and not the cost of purchasing energy (T.
Brown & Faruqui, 2014). Utilities size their distribution system to meet maximum
instantaneous demand (i.e., kW) rather than to meet volumetric demand. Demand charges
are a step in moving distribution tariffs towards cost causation: charging customers based
on their maximum kW demanded sends a more targeted signal of “demand less, pay
less/demand more, pay more”, thus helping utilities to recover their costs of distribution
more efficiently. While this type of rate design more accurately aligns costs with prices, it
requires metering technologies that many customers do not have installed.
When oil and gas distributors were challenged by competition from electric
utilities attempting to gain market share in the heating of American homes, the issue was
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less about utilities offering to heat people’s homes, but rather that they were providing
financial incentives and subsidies for the one-time costs of customers switching to
electric heating. Furthermore, the electric utilities were allowed to write these costs off in
their cost of service studies, and recoup them through electric rates. Oil and gas
distributors were upset by these programs and fought them fiercely.
However, the tides have changed. Utilities are now faced with the threat of
distributed solar resources. While there are some similarities between these two cases, the
current expansion of solar is substantially different than the events of the 1960s. Across
the country, rooftop solar is gaining popularity and installed capacity is growing at
unprecedented rates (Association, 2015). As distributed solar continues to boom, utilities
are becoming increasingly concerned with the impacts that it has on their financial
sustainability. Specifically, utilities are concerned that they are being forced to transmit
customer generated solar for free and that they will have to make up lost revenue through
non-solar customers. In California, utilities such as PG&E are focused specifically on Net
Metering 2.0 and how increasing installed solar capacity along with the emergence of
storage technologies could disrupt the electricity market. With DG solar installations
nearing the 5% cap and projections of increasing rates of installations, it seems probably
that DG solar will play an increasing role in California’s generation mix in the years to
come (“Devolving power,” 2014). It is clear that rooftop solar is seen as a threat by
utilities, and at first glance it may seem reminiscent of the 1960s, when electric
companies attempted to transition customers away from gas heating. However, in this
case, utilities may very well be justified in their opposition. It is also possibly due to a
concern with becoming obsolete.
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Most of the opposition to NEM programs in California comes from IOUs and
their respective advocacy groups. The proceedings of Net Metering 2.0 have drawn
extensive comments and pressure from the utility interest groups. The most prevalent
arguments that these groups cite (the ones that seem to have the most traction) are that
current net metering rates shift costs between customer classes, and that customers with
DG solar are not being held responsible for paying their fair share to the grid (Trabish,
2016), which may in fact be true. Furthermore, utilities have now turned to minority and
low-income areas for support—claiming that the rise of solar will drive up their rates in
the absence of a government subsidy. In the recent hearings, the primary opposition from
electric utilities has come in the form of arguments against cross subsidies that are
occurring and the need for rates that more accurately charge customers for the costs they
incur, calling this “cost causation” (Warrick, 2015).
As outlined in the previous section, utilities continue to make claims that solar
customers—who dramatically reduce their bills through NEM programs—should still be
responsible for a substantial amount of costs that are associated with providing them
service. Because the utility is still required to meet its revenue requirement, the sales
losses to solar customers must be made up through increasing rates to all customers,
which disproportionally affects non-solar customers. The lost revenue from solar
customers that must be made up by the remainder of the customer base is considered cost
shifting from one group to another. In this way, customers who decide not to install solar
must pay for the fixed costs of the grid while solar customers will contribute much less,
even though they continue to use it. PG&E has claimed that the successor tariff to the
current NEM program would result in $2.5-$5 billion in cost shifting by 2020 (Electric,
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2015). The premise of this argument is relatively simple and has been documented in
countless publications (see, for example: Lee, 2016; The Electricity Journal, 2013;
Trabish, 2015b). Despite these arguments, utilities continue to promote their support for
customers who wish to adopt rooftop solar (Electric, 2015).
PG&E’s proposal reflects its interest in reducing the amount of cost shifting
between classes and increasing the alignment of costs with residential rates. First, their
proposal recommends changing the compensation rate for energy sold to the grid from
the retail rate to the generation rate, estimated at approximately $0.097/kWh (CAPUC,
2016). The proposed demand charges in association with PG&Es rate structure would be
designed to recover the costs that vary with the customer’s load. As we will see below,
the underlying issues involve more than simply an analysis of utility costs and customer
rates.

Theoretical Framework
As solar technologies become increasingly less expensive, it is ever more clear
that we must utilize these resources in the most efficient way possible. Solar—both
central and rooftop systems—present certain technical challenges of intermittency and
reliability, so we cannot simply assume that all of our energy can come from these
sources without first ensuring that we have a system in place that is capable of storing,
transmitting, and distributing this type of generation. While pricing and providing
incentives for central, utility scale solar plants will be a critical policy issue in the
foreseeable future, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the rapidly
increasing demand for rooftop solar systems.
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The policy that is currently being examined in California—Net Metering—plays a
central role in determining how solar expands in the coming years. This policy credits
solar customers for the excess energy that they produce with on-site solar systems. The
rate at which customers are currently credited is the retail electricity rate. IOUs, however,
argue that this rate is too high. At first glance, it may seem like this is simply a discussion
about a reasonable price for solar energy. A closer examination reveals that it actually
results from an attempt to expand the net metering program within a system that was not
designed to effectively handle this type of policy.
In implementing a transition to renewable energy, the incentives that are provided
to renewable energy production directly affect the amount of generation capacity that is
installed. If the price at which solar generators are able to sell their energy is set too high,
we will see an overinvestment (above the socially efficient level) in distributed
renewables. Alternatively, if the price that generators are offered is too low, we will see
investment that is below what would be optimal. Many economists and policy makers
agree that the use of accurate price signals is the most efficient way to allocate resources,
including with distributed solar generation (Lazar, 2011). This, in essence, is what the
current debate over Net Metering is about—sending appropriate price signals to
customers who wish to install rooftop solar.
Electric utilities are unique in that they are considered to be natural monopolies.
That is, the firms are characterized by decreasing average total costs, and engaging in
competition would increase the cost to provide their service. As a monopoly, electric
utilities warrant some form of regulation (Nicholson & Snyder, 2010). Without
regulation, monopolistic firms have the ability to influence the market price by
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determining the quantity that they produce. In the case of electric utilities, however, their
monopoly power is heavily regulated by the PUC. The need for price regulation comes
from the fear that, if left unattended, a monopoly power would charge its customers
prohibitively high rates.
It is generally understood among economists and politicians that a reasonable goal
is to attempt to maximize social welfare. This has been a strong rationale for increasing
competition in many markets, but is also at the center of utility regulation. The general
illustration of a monopolistic firm is presented in Figure 4. In this case, the firm
Figure	
  4:	
  Supply	
  and	
  Demand	
  of	
  a	
  Monopolistic	
  Firm	
  
(Cicchetti	
  et	
  al.,	
  2004)
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of externalities, the socially efficient outcome is where a perfectly competitive market
would settle—at Qc. This outcome is efficient because all customers who are willing to
buy at this price are able to, and all firms willing to sell have been included. The price
associated with this point is Pcompetition and is considered the market-clearing price. Any
deviation away from this quantity will result in some deadweight loss (DWL), as

	
  

51	
  

transactions have either been restricted, or too many have occurred such that the MC was
greater than the marginal benefit.
If left unregulated, the firm will chose a quantity Qm such that their marginal
revenue from providing the last unit of output (MRi) is equal to the marginal cost
associated with providing that same unit of output (MCi). By doing so, the firm is able to
maximize its profits, and will charge its customers a price of Pmonopoly, which is equivalent
to the price that customers are willing to pay for that quantity of service (Nicholson &
Snyder, 2010). Because one of the original goals of electricity price regulation was to
ensure that no customer was charged more than the marginal cost of providing them
service, the price with regulation (Pregulation) would be set at PSSMax and the quantity
produced would be QSSMax. At both Pmonopoly and Pregulation there is a net welfare loss
associated with too little or too much (respectively) electricity provided.
Figure 5 illustrates a similar monopoly situation, but with some differences that
make it more characteristic of electric utilities. In this case, instead of facing an upward
sloping marginal cost curve, the firm
experiences decreasing marginal costs.

Figure	
  5:	
  Decreasing	
  Cost	
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  Firm	
  (Cicchetti	
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al.,	
  2004)
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will often result in losses to the electric utility. The same principles can be used to
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determine Pmonopoly and PSSMax and are shown on the graph. However, because marginal
costs are decreasing, setting the price equal to the marginal cost will result in inadequate
revenue for the firm to recover its costs. In attempting to price electric service so that it
represents the marginal costs associated with providing service, the regulator must accept
that this will result in the utility operating at a loss. The regulator must either accept this,
or adjust the price to a point above the marginal cost so that the firm can break even. If
the regulatory body does not wish to subsidize the utility indefinitely, it must raise the
price so that it is equal to the average costs of the utility. In this way, the regulator can
ensure that utilities are not taking advantage of their market power, while simultaneously
allowing them to meet their breakeven level of profits.
Before examining the current debate over Net Metering, it is helpful to illustrate
how energy might be sold back to the grid under a more efficient system. In this model,
we would have energy generated by rooftop solar sold back to the grid at a price that is
exactly equal to its societal value at the time it is sold back. This would result in an
efficient investment in distributed generation, so long as the costs of other sources of
energy also reflected their full costs and benefits to society. And therein lies the problem:
there are a number of un-priced externalities that exist in the production of electricity that
are not accurately reflected in the prices that power consumers pay.
Understanding the benefits and value of energy generated from rooftop solar
systems is critical to determining the efficient price at which households should be
compensated. For many years, one of the main rationales for promoting solar generation
has been the slough of environmental and public health benefits associated with
producing green energy. These systems are much larger, and sell energy in the wholesale
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market. Thus, it is unclear the level at which we should invest in rooftop solar versus
utility scale solar or other clean energy systems. One argument is that rooftop solar
generation will displace some quantity of grid generation, reducing GHG emissions as
well as local pollutants. Not only are the environmental and public health benefits of
distributed solar the most popular reason for providing additional incentives, but they are
also the easiest to estimate. Advocates of rooftop solar also argue that investing in
rooftop solar creates jobs, provides energy security, and stabilizes energy prices. The
range and magnitude of these benefits is still widely debated and they are therefore
excluded from most analyses (Borenstein, 2011).
The most common method used to determine the cost of a particular energy
source is called the levelized cost of energy (LCOE). In theory, the LCOE represents the
constant price for generated power that would ensure that the net present value of energy
generated is equal to the net present value of the cost of producing that energy. There are
many factors that contribute to these estimates, many of which (costs of current
technologies, efficiency of technologies, etc.) are fairly easy to determine. However,
there are often wide discrepancies in the estimates due to assumptions about
macroeconomic trends as well as future technology costs and capacity factors. LCOE
estimates can be helpful in drawing comparisons between generators, and they are often
central to policy discussions. However, there are differences even within generators of
the same fuel source that make such comparisons problematic. Borenstein (2011)
explains that because different technologies are designed for different types of energy
production, they are not feasibly substitutable. For example, combined-cycle gas turbine
plants are extremely efficient to operate, but are generally very expensive to build.
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Alternatively, single-cycle combustion gas turbines are significantly less efficient, but are
also much cheaper to build. Consequently, combined-cycle plants run most of the time
and provide the “base” power load, while single-cycle plants are only fired up during
periods of peak demand, and are only operated a few hours every year.
Additionally, these estimates do not reflect the time variation in energy prices. In
the California wholesale market, energy prices can fluctuate a factor of 10 throughout a
day. Without the use of time varying rates and meters that can measure time-of-use, it is
not possible to reflect this fluctuating value of energy to the end-use customer. The size
of the deadweight loss associated with this is directly determined by which price is
chosen and how volatile the price is over the course of a day.
The Scoping Plan following AB32 outlined numerous tactics for reaching
California’s climate goals, the most far-reaching being the California cap and trade
(CAT) program. Unlike many emission policies, often criticized for being inflexible and
inefficient, CAT programs increase flexibility by allowing emission reduction goals to be
met in a cost-efficient manner. In the California program, emission permits are both
distributed to firms as well as sold through state auctions. During the original allocation,
the State sets a cap on the total emissions by only allowing a certain number of permits,
which firms may then trade in secondary markets. At the end of the year, every firm
covered by the program must turn in the number of permits that covers their emissions
for that period. Firms with an inadequate number of permits face severe fines.
As I previously suggested, the presence of environmental externalities associated
with certain types of production of electricity is often the main rationale for many efforts
to provide subsidies to renewable generation. In California, the CAT program will cover
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85% of all emissions by 2015—when distributors of transportation fuels and natural gas
are set to fall under the cap (Hsia-Kiung, Reyna, & O’Connor, 2013). Following this
expansion, the total cap is set to be cut 12 MMTCO2 (Million Metric Tons CO2) each
subsequent year, which, according to Adams et al. (2008), will provide approximately
22.5% of reductions needed to meet the 2020 goal. Although currently many utilities
receive most of their permits for free, many firms have to purchase permits through state
auctions. This process allows the government to collect revenue and invest in further
emission reductions, which, according to Hsia-Kiung et al. (2013), is crucial in meeting
reduction goals.
While the cap and trade program has priced some negative effects of emissions,
the price for permits has remained near $12/ton for the past few years. The EPA estimates
of the social cost of carbon (SCC) range from $11 to $56, depending on the discount rate
used. These estimates include damages associated with climate change, as well as health
impacts associated with a changing climate. However, this does not include acute health
impacts, and excludes many impacts of climate change, due to a lack of precise data
(EPA, 2015). These estimates for the price of carbon in terms of damages associated with
climate change (excluding acute health impacts associated with the combustion of fossil
fuels) represent the conservative end of the literature. Estimates of the SCC depend
heavily on a number of assumptions used in climate models, including the uncertainty of
temperature change associated with GHG levels as well as estimated costs of climate
damage. The literature on SCC estimates include estimates ranging from $12/ton CO2
(Nordhaus, 2011) to $85/ton CO2 (Stern & Taylor, 2007). It has also been noted that the
literature on estimating the SCC is still somewhat optimistic, and that the true cost of
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carbon may be much greater (Tol, 2008; Weitzman, 2007). Furthermore, these estimates
do not include acute health impacts of particulate mater or other local pollutants, which
may cause damages up to approximately $0.03/kWh, depending on the type of fuel used
to generate electricity (Soderholm & Sundqvist, 2003). The price of permits traded in the
California carbon market is significantly below most estimates for the social price of
carbon, and would suggest that the entire externality has not been internalized.
In a perfectly efficient market, electric generators would be required to pay for the
pollution that they produce, and these costs would simply be another input into their
business model. While there are some mechanisms currently in place to price such
externalities, they do not cover a wide enough range of pollutants or sources to
effectively internalize pollution externalities. The most direct solution is to simply price
the external costs of pollution through a tax or permit program. Following one of these
approaches would create appropriate price signals for renewable generation. Or, at least,
it would correct for the negative pollution externalities—not accounting for non-pollution
benefits of solar generation.
In its simplest form, a price on pollution would increase the cost of producing
dirty energy, and make alternative sources of energy more appealing. The
implementation of a tax can be visualized in both the wholesale and retail markets. In the
wholesale market, the price that generators are willing to accept bids would simply
increase, raising the market clearing price and reducing the market quantity. In the retail
market, the implementation of this tax would shift the marginal cost curve up, also
resulting in higher prices and lower market quantities. The higher prices of dirtier energy
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would provide price signals for customers wishing to sell self-generated energy back to
the grid.
However, there are a number of complexities in the energy markets that would
prevent this type of simple tax from working. In addition to numerous political
constraints that have made such a policy unlikely, the current structure of the electricity
market would prevent it from being fully effective. In order for it to be successful,
customers wishing to sell energy back to the grid would have to be compensated exactly
the value of the power that they displaced, ideally at the exact time they displaced it. This
would require a billing mechanism that charges and credits customers for the wholesale
prices of electricity.
A price on pollution would increase the private costs that utilities face so that they
would match the social costs of these forms of pollution. If electricity generators had to
pay a tax on input fuels that reflected the costs to society of burning that particular fuel,
they would treat this as just another cost of doing business. This would result in a higher
wholesale price of electricity, depending on the carbon intensity of the generated
electricity. This price signal would be passed on to end-use customers in some form. This
would provide them varying degrees of incentive to generate solar energy, depending on
the type of energy that they would be displacing. If these conditions were met, a direct
price on pollution would produce much greater efficiency.
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Conclusion
Many utilities, including PG&E claim that they “[support] our customers who
want to ‘go solar’” (Electric, 2015, p. 2). At the same time, however, many solar
advocates claim that the rates proposed by utilities would stifle, if not destroy the
attempts to expand rooftop solar, and that “the utilities are fighting tooth and nail”
(Warrick, 2015) to get commissions to side with them. It is unclear through the
proceedings to what extent electric utilities are in support of the expansion of rooftop
solar and net energy metering. As some analysts have suggested the question may
ultimately be about the structure of utility rates as a whole, and not just net metering. As
one phrased it, “If my neighbor invests- or leases – solar panels and ends up using less,
my rates go up to make up the difference. Should I get angry at my neighbor for installing
solar PVs […] or should I conclude that the tariffs charged by my local utility need a
fundamental overhaul?” (The Electricity Journal, 2013, p. 2).
Electric utilities have cited the duties of the commission in their opposition to NEM
throughout this case. One of the main requirements for the PUC in this case is that it
develop a successor tariff that “ensures that customer-sited renewable distributed
generation continues to grow sustainably” (CAPUC, 2014b). Not surprisingly, this has
become a contentious issue within the proceedings. Solar advocates, including CALSEIA
and TASC have suggested that sustainable growth be defined as “growth [that is] robust
enough to overcome actions that can reduce or inhibit growth, such as the looming end of
the ITC for residential customers […] and continue on a constantly growing course”
(CAPUC, 2016). This definition should come as no surprise from the solar advocates, as
it would prevent the establishment of barriers to expanding DG solar. Electric utilities,
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including PG&E however, put forth a definition of sustainably as “without subsidy from
other ratepayers” (CAPUC, 2016). This should also not be surprising.
It is clear that there is no objective definition of what was meant by “sustainable”
growth of the solar industry. Both sides have put forth rationales that would support their
vested interests. If followed, the utility’s definition would promote an end or curtailment
of NEM policies, while the solar advocates’ would result in more robust market
conditions for distributed solar. In the proceeding, the commission developed a definition
that it deemed to be a reasonable compromise. It defined sustainably as “preserving and
fostering sufficient market conditions to facilitate robust adoption of customer-sited
renewable generation while minimizing potential cost impacts to non-participants over
time” (CAPUC, 2016). While this was interpreted by the commission as being in the
middle of the two proposed definitions, it was still widely contentious among solar
advocates. Analysis of proposed rates using the Public Tool relies heavily on a number of
assumptions. Solar advocates claim that the projections of the costs to install residential
solar are much lower than in reality. This would overestimate the ability of solar to
overcome market barriers, skewing the results against DG solar (CAPUC, 2016).
Furthermore, another widely debated aspect of this proceeding has been in the
interpretation of prior legislation requiring the commission to ensure that “the total
benefits of the standard contract or tariff to all customers and the electrical system are
approximately equal to the total costs” (CAPUC, 2014a). There has been much debate on
how to calculate these costs and benefits, and how to interpret the results. The
commission does acknowledge that at this time, it is simply easier and more
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straightforward to calculate the costs associated with DG solar than it is to attempt to
calculate the benefits.
While many solar advocates proposed the addition of a number of benefits associated
with DG solar, the commission decided that their recommendations were premature and
that it was not possible at this time to include these benefits. Among the suggested
benefits were the “Societal Cost of Carbon, Reliability and Land Use Benefits, Local
Economic Benefits, Societal Cost of PM 10, Societal Cost of NOx, and Water Use”
(CAPUC, 2016). The estimated costs and benefits range widely from benefits of $2.1
million per year to costs of $5 billion per year (Beach & McGuire, 2013; Litteneker &
Walter, 2014).
What has been made clear by the arguments presented in this proceeding is that
developing a successor to the current NEM program will involve a number of decisions
that involve high degrees of uncertainty. The difficulty is that each side has presented a
different set of goals that should be targeted. Solar advocates clearly favor proposals that
would encourage the growth of rooftop solar (as demonstrated by their definition of
“sustainable growth” and objection to solar cost estimates), while electric utilities—
continuing to claim they support DG solar—advocate for policies that would diminish the
benefits to customers adopting solar generation technologies. As Peskoe (2016)
commented on the development of utility regulation, the outcome is largely determined
by subjective decision-making, as many ratemaking proposals often rely on “imprecise”
measures. It is unclear to what extent each constituency is attempting to reach an efficient
outcome, or if they are simply trying to achieve their own goals. Without examining the
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entire electricity market, attempting to make small changes to the ways we buy and sell
energy will be largely unsuccessful.
Over the past two decades under net metering policies, we have seen tremendous
growth of rooftop solar installations. While this can be partially attributed to rapidly
decreasing costs of solar PV technologies, it is also largely due to the financial incentives
that have been put in place by local, state, and national agencies. While net metering has
been touted as one of the most influential of these policies, we are now finding that it
may not be as sustainable as previously thought. While originally intended to promote the
growth of distributed solar, imposing net metering onto a rate structure that relies on
volumetric rates to recover fixed costs has put electric utilities at a disadvantage.
Continuing to provide solar customers retail rate compensation for their generated
energy—in the absence of government subsidization—will put increasing financial stress
on electric utilities.
In order to develop a net metering program that is acceptable to both electric utilities
and solar advocates, and to achieve the socially efficient outcome, the underlying rate
structure and un-priced environmental externalities must be addressed. In most states,
rate structures for residential customers are only beginning to be re-examined.
Additionally, California has one of the most comprehensive carbon trading programs in
the country. While many states are attempting to create more efficient electric markets,
there are none that have solved both problems of externalities and underlying rate
structures. As outlined above, consumer bills must be changed so that fixed and variable
costs are recovered through separate mechanisms. This structure was developed in a time
when increasing electricity sales and steadily decreasing electricity prices (as they
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achieved economies of scale) allowed utilities to be less concerned by the exact ways that
they recovered their costs. This model was viable when the relationship between buyers
and sellers of electricity was unidirectional. Net metering policies developed in recent
decades, and the subsequent growth in rooftop solar have shown that this pricing model is
not compatible with an electric system in which customers are both consumers and
producers, buyers and sellers, of energy.
In addition to changing the underlying rate structure, solar customers must also
receive the correct price for the energy that they generate. Specifically, they should be
compensated at the exact value of the energy that they have offset. Because the most
commonly cited benefits (at least in the scope of this thesis) of rooftop solar is offsetting
pollution from dirtier sources of energy, the price for solar customers should be equal to
the societal cost of this pollution (i.e. the benefit of avoiding it). This requires that the
price of energy be allowed to fluctuate throughout the day, reflecting the different sources
that are being utilized. Finally, the pollution associated with the production of non-solar
energy must be priced correctly and internalized by electricity generators.
While the current Net Metering 2.0 proceeding highlights a clash of solar
advocates and electric utilities, it is in fact revealing an underlying structural flaw that has
been present all along. In order to send the appropriate price signals to solar customers,
both the structure by which utilities recover costs and the rate at which solar customers
are compensated must be reconceived. Unless and until the price is right, net metering
will likely continue to provoke aggressive opposition from electric utilities. Promoting
endless rooftop solar expansion will not sufficiently reduce our greenhouse gas emissions
to avoid the most severe impacts of climate change. Continuing to subsidize rooftop solar

	
  

63	
  

will help reach these goals, but we should simultaneously address underlying structural
issues if we hope to have rooftop solar provide a significant share of our energy in the
future.
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